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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Officer Miller frisked Montey Moon even though, at the moment of the frisk, a
reasonably prudent person in the officer's position would not have been justified in concluding
that Mr. Moon was armed and presently dangerous.

Mindful that the frisk occurred while

Officer Miller was still trying to ascertain Mr. Moon's identity after observing a seatbelt
violation, Mr. Moon asserts that the frisk violated Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and unlawfully extended the duration of the stop. Mr. Moon entered a
conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine, preserving his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court erred in denying Mr. Moon's
motion to suppress, and this Court should vacate Mr. Moon's conviction, reverse the order
denying Mr. Moon's motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 30, 2018, at approximately 10:30 in the evening, officers were advised to
be on the lookout for a tan car for a welfare check. (4/4/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-10; p.39, L.21 - p.42,
L.9.) Officer James Miller saw a silver car, and followed it. (4/4/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-6; p.42,
Ls.10-14.) The car did not have a rear license plate. (4/4/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-13; p.44, L.23 p.45, L.13.) He initiated a traffic stop of the car. (4/4/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.13-23.) The driver was
unable to provide a driver's license, registration, or insurance paperwork. (4/4/19 Tr., p.12,
Ls.13-17.) There were two passengers, one male and one female, in the car who were not
wearing seatbelts, and Officer Miller asked them for their identification. (4/4/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.920.) The male passenger gave the name, Tyrone Eagle, but Officer Miller was unable to locate

1

Mr. Eagle's records in his computer system. (4/4/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.3-19; p.21, Ls.23-25.) The
officers at the scene had a conversation about the smell of marijuana-Officer Pokorney, who
had remained by Officer Miller's car and had not approached the silver car, claimed to have
smelled marijuana, but Officer Miller had not smelled marijuana. 1 ( 4/4/19 Tr., p.50, L.6 - p.51,
L.23; p.51, Ls.4-11; State's Exh. 1; 20:19:52-20:19-58; 20:19:58-20:20:14.) Officer Pokorney
testified that he saw the backseat passenger moving-leaning forward and leaning down to the
side-while Officer Miller was on the computer in his car. (4/4/19 Tr., p.82, L.19 - p.83, L.18.)
Officer Miller explained that Mr. Moon was moving about because he was trying to fmd a place
to put his cigarette out.

(4/4/19 Tr., p.48, L.12 - p.49, L.6; p.84, Ls.1-10; State's Exh. 1;

20: 19:09-20: 19:23.)
Officer Miller had the driver exit the car, and during their conversation, the driver told
Officer Miller that she used a false name because she did not have a valid driver's license.
(4/4/19 Tr., p.16, L.11 - p.17, L.2.) Officer Miller then asked the female passenger to step out of
the vehicle. (4/4/19 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-23.) Officer Miller then came back to the car and spoke to
Mr. Moon about his name and social security number, in an attempt to identify him. (4/4/19
Tr., p.20, L.7 - p.21, L.21.) Officer Miller asked Mr. Moon to step out of the car and handcuffed
him because he was unable to verify Mr. Moon's identity and people who gave false names often
had warrants. (4/4/19 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-25; p.22, Ls.1-13; p.66, Ls.7-10.)
Prior to asking Mr. Moon to exit the car, Officer Miller had not observed any drugs or
drug-related items. (4/4/19 Tr., p.47, L.20 - p.48, L.4; p.67, Ls.6-21.) Officer Miller testified
that he could have issued citations for seatbelts and a missing license plate at that point in the
stop. (4/4/19 Tr., p.57, Ls.6-18.) He asked Mr. Moon to step out of the car, detaining him,
1

Officer Jacob Pokorney testified that he could smell marijuana while standing 20-25 feet away
from the car. (4/4/19 Tr., p.96, Ls.3-7.)
2

because Mr. Moon "hadn't provided [the officer] with identification that [the officer] could use
to positively identify him, which is against the law." (4/4/19 Tr., p.59, Ls.1-8.) Once Mr. Moon
stepped out of the car, Officer Miller smelled marijuana on Mr. Moon's person.

(4/4/19

Tr., p.22, Ls.14-19; p.66, L.25 - p.67, L.7.) Mr. Moon denied having marijuana on his person.
(4/4/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.20-25.) Officer Miller conducted a pat-down search of Mr. Moon based on
"[p]lain sense, plain smell." (4/4/19 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-4; p.66, Ls.13-14.) He did not suspect that
Mr. Moon was carrying a weapon, and he did not believe Mr. Moon was armed and dangerous.
(4/4/19 Tr., p.66, Ls.13-24.) Officer Miller did not see a weapon in the car during the course of
the traffic stop.

(4/4/19 Tr., p.58, Ls.12-14.)

Officer Miller did not locate anything on

Mr. Moon's person. (4/4/19 Tr., p.23, Ls.5-6.)
After the pat-down, Officer Miller saw a piece of plastic straw in the seat where
Mr. Moon had been sitting, with a burn mark on one end. (4/4/19 Tr., p.23, L.16 - p.24, L.1.)
The substance in the straw tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine.

(4/4/19

Tr., p.33, L.10 - p.34, L.13.) Officer Miller conducted a search of the vehicle and located other
items of drug paraphernalia, including broken glass that the officer believed used to be a
methamphetamine pipe in the area where Mr. Moon's feet would have been in the car. (4/4/19
Tr., p.25, L.20 - p.28, L.2.) The front passenger seat had a syringe underneath it.

(4/4/19

Tr., p.29, Ls.16-19.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information alleging that Mr. Moon committed
one count of possession of methamphetamine, one count of destruction of evidence, and the
persistent violator sentencing enhancement.

(R., pp.37-40.)

Thereafter, Mr. Moon filed a

Motion and Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.49-54, 85-100.) He asserted that the
evidence gathered against him should be suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and
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Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, because the officers illegally extended the duration of
the stop to conduct a search of Mr. Moon, the officer did not have reasonable, articulable
suspicion to remove Mr. Moon from the car or to conduct a pat-down search of Mr. Moon, and
the plain view doctrine does not negate the illegal actions of the officers. (R., pp.49-50, 85-100,
110-11.) The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Moon's motion to suppress.
(R., pp.101-09.) A hearing was held on Mr. Moon's motion. (4/4/19 Tr., generally.)
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp.112-27.) The district court
found that Officer Miller, after seeing the driver violate the equipment laws, initiated an
encounter with the driver to let her know of the violation.

(R., p.117.) The district court

concluded that Officer Miller had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the car as it did not
have license plates or a properly placed temporary registration, contrary to Idaho law.
(R., p.117.)

The district court concluded that the duration and scope of the investigatory

detention was reasonable because Officer Miller observed the statutory seatbelt violation and
was investigating potential false information. (R., p.120.)
The court concluded that the exit order and subsequent pat down of Mr. Moon was
reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate Mr. Moon's constitutional rights.
(R., p.123.) The district court reasoned, "Officer Miller testified that he was not fearful for his
safety before he asked Moon to exit the car and conducted a pat down search, but did testify to
smelling the odor of marijuana coming from the passenger side of the vehicle where Moon was
seated." (R., p.124.)
The court concluded:
It is routine for officers to ask a person seated in a vehicle to exit the vehicle prior
to a lawful search. Upon smelling the odor of marijuana, Officer Miller asked
Moon to exit the vehicle. Upon doing so the officer frisked Moon to check for
weapons and asked if he had any substances, including marijuana, on his person.
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In looking at the totality of the circumstances, it is logical to conclude that a pat
down search of weapons and/or concealed items was justified as the officer did
not know if Moon had any weapons on his person, had observed his furtive
movements in the backseat, and could smell the odor of marijuana coming from
the area he was in. Thus, Officer Miller's request for Moon [to] exit the vehicle
and the subsequent frisk in search of weapons was reasonable and not a violation
of Moon's Fourth Amendment rights.
(R., pp.124-25.) The court held that the plain view exception was applicable:
Officer Miller was in a position to view the area of the back seat while lawfully
conducting a frisk for weapons. He also knew immediately that the item seen was
that related to the use of controlled substances. As such, the plain view exception
to the warrant requirement is applicable and the seizure of the evidence by Officer
Miller was lawful.
(R., p.126.)
Mr. Moon entered a conditional guilty plea, pleading guilty to one count of felony
possession of a controlled substance and, pursuant to the agreement, the State dismissed the
destruction of evidence charge and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. 2 (1/6/20
Tr., p.53, L.10-p.54, L.14; R., pp.223-31, 241.) The terms of the plea agreement also preserved
Mr. Moon's right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. (1/6/20 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.54,
L.54; R., pp.224, 233.) The district court sentenced Mr. Moon to seven years, with three years
fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (1/6/20 Tr.,p.58, Ls.18-23; R., pp.241-45.) The sentence was
ordered to be served concurrently with Bannock County case number CR-013-16890. (1/6/20
Tr., p.58, L.18 - p.59, L.3; R., p.242.) Mr. Moon was subsequently placed on probation after
completing the rider programming. (Aug., p.1.) Mr. Moon filed a Notice of Appeal timely from
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.250-53, 260-64.)

2

Mr. Moon also admitted to violating his probation in Bannock County case number CR-01316890. (1/6/20 Tr., p.54, Ls.3-6; p.57, Ls.1-24.)
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Moon's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Moon's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Moon asserts that the police officer's pat-down search violated his Fourth

Amendment rights, which unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop. The officer did
not pat-down Mr. Moon because he suspected Mr. Moon had a weapon or because he believed
Mr. Moon was armed and dangerous.

Mindful that Officer Miller was still investigating

Mr. Moon's identity related to the seatbelt violation, Mr. Moon contends that his unlawful patdown extended the duration of the traffic stop beyond that necessary for the officer to complete
the mission of the stop; thus, the district court erred by denying Mr. Moon's motion to suppress
the evidence obtained.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact "unless they
are clearly erroneous." State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013).
This Court exercises free review of "the trial court's application of constitutional principles to
the facts found." Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Moon's Motion To Suppress Because
Officer Miller Did Not Have Reason To Believe That Mr. Moon Was Armed And
Presently Dangerous
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable

searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In order to be reasonable, a search must be authorized by a
warrant based on probable cause, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 818 (2009). "[T]o be reasonable a search must be authorized by

a warrant that is based on probable cause, unless one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement applies." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 818 (2009) (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).

"One such exception is the pat-down search for weapons

acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)]."
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818. "Under Terry, an officer may conduct a limited pat-down search, or

frisk, 'of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons."' Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 30) (citing Florida v. J.L., 539 U.S. 266, 270
(2000)). "Such a frisk is only justified when, at the moment of the frisk, the officer has reason to
believe that the individual he or she is investigating is 'armed and presently dangerous to the
officer or to others' and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter dispels the officer's belie£"
Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 30).

"The test is an objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a risk of
danger." Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-61 (2007)). "To
satisfy this standard, the officer must indicate 'specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts,' in light of his or her experience, justify the
officer's suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous."
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Id. at 818-19 (quoting

Henage, 143 Idaho at 660). "Although an officer need not possess absolute certainty that an
individual is armed and dangerous, an officer's 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
"hunch"' is not enough to justify a frisk." Id. at 819 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
"Several factors influence whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would
conclude that a particular person was armed and dangerous."

Id.

"These factors include:

whether there were any bulges in the suspect' s clothing that resembled a weapon; whether the
encounter took place late at night or in a high crime area; and whether the individual made
threatening or furtive movements, indicated that he or she possessed a weapon, appeared nervous
or agitated, appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, was unwilling to
cooperate, or had a reputation for being dangerous." Id. "Whether any of these considerations,
taken together or by themselves, are enough to justify a Terry frisk depends on an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances." Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Henage, 143 Idaho at 661-62).
"For a frisk to be held constitutional, an officer must demonstrate how the facts he or she relied
on in conducting the frisk support the conclusion that the suspect posed a risk of danger." Id.
(citing Henage, 143 Idaho at 661-62).
In denying the motion to suppress, the district court found, "Officer Miller testified that
he was not fearful for his safety before he asked Moon to exit the car and conducted a pat down
search, but did testify to smelling the odor of marijuana coming from the passenger side of the
vehicle where Moon was seated." (R., p.124.) "It is routine for officers to ask a person seated in
a vehicle to exit the vehicle prior to a lawful search. Upon smelling the odor of marijuana,
Officer Miller asked Moon to exit the vehicle." (R., p.124.) However, the district court also
found that "Officer Miller testified that he was not fearful for his safety before he asked Moon to
exit the car and conducted a pat down search ... " (R., p.124.)
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The district court erred.

The pat-down for "weapons and/or concealed items" was

unlawful where a reasonable and prudent officer would not suspect Mr. Moon was armed and
dangerous. A Terry frisk for weapons is carefully proscribed. It is "a carefully limited search of
the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16; State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 647 (2017) (holding officer exceeded
permissible scope of Terry frisk by opening containers he believed contained drugs, not
weapons). A Terry frisk is thus distinct from a search incident to an arrest whereby the officers
are free to search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence." Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Lee, 162 Idaho at 650.
As the Idaho Court of Appeals explained in State v. Baxter:
In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court created a stop-and-frisk
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The stop and the frisk
constitute two independent actions, each requiring a distinct and separate
justification.
The stop is justified if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. However, grounds to
justify a lawful investigatory stop do not automatically justify a frisk for weapons.
An officer may frisk an individual if the officer can point to specific and
articulable facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the
individual with whom the officer is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel this
belief
144 Idaho 672, 678 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted.)
While the encounter took place at night, there is no indication that Mr. Moon had a bulge
in his pocket that resembled a weapon, made any threatening or furtive movements, appeared to

be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or was unwilling to cooperate with the officers. 3
These are factors that can be considered under the totality of the circumstances, see Bishop, 146
Idaho at 819, but they are not present here.
Here, Officer Miller was investigating Mr. Moon's identity. (4/4/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.9-13.)
That fact that Mr. Moon's identity could not be located on the officers' computer system would
not justify a reasonably prudent person in concluding that Mr. Moon was armed and presently
dangerous. See Baxter, 144 Idaho at 679 (holding that even though the officer suspected that the
defendant was possibly lying about his identity, and was really a wanted person, there was no
evidence that the defendant or the other individuals in the car were uncooperative). Even if
Mr. Moon's identity was unknown to the officer, absent a belief that there were weapons in the
car or that Mr. Moon was armed and dangerous, a pat-down search was not justified. See State v.
Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 30 (2017) (holding the officer's lack of knowledge as to "who was who,

who was where, who was doing what" was not a sufficient justification for the pat-down).
Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person in Officer Miller's
position would not have been justified in concluding that Mr. Moon presented a risk of danger.
The facts articulated by Officer Miller-the smell of marijuana on or near Mr. Moon and the
officer's belief that Mr. Moon was not telling him his correct name-taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, do not give rise to a conclusion that Mr. Moon was armed
and presently dangerous to the officer or others. Because Officer Miller did not have reason to
believe that Mr. Moon was armed and presently dangerous, and even testified that he did believe

3

Although the district court found that Mr. Moon's movements in the backseat were "furtive,"
Officer Miller testified that Mr. Moon was just looking for a place to put out the cigarette he was
smoking. (4/4/19 Tr., p.48, L.12 - p.49, L.6; p.54, Ls.5-25; p.84, Ls.1-10; State's Exh. 1;
20:19:09-20:19:23.) Further, even if Mr. Moon's movements were "furtive," the officer testified
that he did not believe there were weapons in the car. (4/4/19 Tr., p.58, Ls.12-14.)
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Mr. Moon was armed or dangerous or that there was a weapon in the car, the frisk violated
Mr. Moon's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.

D.

The Unwarranted Pat-Down Frisk Of Mr. Moon Unlawfully Extended The Duration Of
The Stop
Mr. Moon asserts that the duration of the traffic stop was unlawfully extended by his

unwarranted pat-down search. Mindful that Officer Miller was still investigating Mr. Moon's
identity related to the seatbelt violation, Mr. Moon contends that his unlawful pat-down extended
the duration of the traffic stop beyond that necessary for the officer to complete the mission of
the stop. An approximately three-minute delay in this case occurred when Officer Miller ceased
investigating the license plate, the seatbelt violations, and the driver's licensure status and
instead opted to handcuff and pat-down Mr. Moon for weapons.
20:37:00.)

(State's Exh. 1; 20:34:13-

The district court may have implicitly found that Officer Miller had reasonable

suspicion to initiate a drug investigation after smelling marijuana on or near Mr. Moon. (See
R., p.115.) However, Officer Miller did not initiate a drug investigation. Instead, he performed
a pat-down frisk for weapons. Even if Officer Miller smelled marijuana on or near Mr. Moon, he
unlawfully extended the traffic stop to search for weapons.
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of the occupants that implicates the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Law enforcement may stop a person for a brief, investigatory detention if
the officer has an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person stopped is, or is
about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (citations
omitted). "The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law
enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect."
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Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "[A]n investigative detention must be temporary

and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id. "Similarly, the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to
verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Id. (citations omitted). "It is
the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable
suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an
investigative seizure." Id.
In Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the United States Supreme Court
held "a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made
violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." Id. at 350. In so finding, the
Rodriguez Court made clear that it was adhering to the line drawn in its prior decision in
Illinois v. Caballes.

Id. 575 U.S. at 350-51; see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)

(holding that a lawful seizure justified only by a traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the purpose of issuing a ticket for the
violation).
Here, the district court erred in finding that the duration of the stop was not unlawfully
extended or delayed. The district court concluded "the seizure of Mr. Moon was of limited
duration in light of the circumstances created by Moon's criminal action. Officer Miller had to
take a significant amount of time to try and determine who Moon was to be able to process the
statutory violations." (R., pp.122-23.) The district court found that Officer Miller described the
length of the stop as " ... a lengthy period of time." (R., p.123.) The court did not separately
analyze the delay caused by the pat-down frisk. (See R., pp.122-23.)
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However, the pat-down constituted a detour from the purpose of the stop. When Officer
Miller began pat searching Mr. Moon for weapons, despite having no basis to do so, he
abandoned or detoured from the mission of the stop for almost three minutes.

(See State's

Exhibit 1; 20:34:25-20:37:00.)
Mindful that Officer Miller was still investigating Mr. Moon's identity related to the
seatbelt violation, Mr. Moon contends that his unlawful pat-down extended the duration of the
traffic stop beyond that necessary for the officer to complete the mission of the stop. The fruits
of the search that followed that illegal detention must therefore be suppressed as "fruit of the
poisonous tree."

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963); State v.

Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549 (Ct. App. 2000).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Moon respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 4 th day of September, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of September, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

SJC/eas

15

